



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

JUNE, 1915

## THE DUTY OF AMERICA

BY THE EDITOR

BECAUSE Great Britain refused to permit the United States to supply the German army with foodstuffs Germany officially assassinated more than a hundred American citizens. That is the naked fact from which escape is impossible. Explanations cannot explain; excuses cannot palliate; the monstrous crime was premeditated, was threatened, and was perpetrated. The whole story of the sinking of the *Lusitania* is contained in those few words. Nothing need be added, and nothing can be taken away. Whatever course future events may take, whatever settlement of the great war may finally be effected, whatever attitude our own or any other country may assume, the debasement of Germany as a civilized nation is writ upon the pages of history by her own hand; her reversion to barbarism is established at the bar of humanity, there to remain throughout the lives of this and succeeding generations; the stain upon her honor is indelible. This Nation is confronted by no necessity of inflicting punishment upon Germany. The reprobation of all mankind whose effect will continue for years to come is a fully adequate penalty which, unfortunately but inevitably, the innocent German people, in common with the guilty German Government, must prepare to suffer.

Nor is it the duty of America to "fight for the Allies." We have no concern with European conflicts. If Fate has decreed

that fight we must, it must be in the cause of peace, not for the sake of war. Our obligation cannot even be restricted to our own selfish interests. "America First" is not sufficiently comprehensive. It is the rights of neutrals, of *all* neutrals, which we are in duty bound to maintain—by force, if necessary—in the interest of a civilization which could not survive the putting of a premium upon war. And we should take particular care at a time when righteous indignation tends to dominate our souls to keep our true course clearly in mind.

Neutrality was the first item of foreign policy adopted by our government, in Washington's administration. It was then a novel thing in international relations. Thitherto it had been the custom for every nation to side with one belligerent or the other in a war, or else to have nothing to do with either. Neutrality, as formerly understood, had meant non-intercourse. But Washington proposed—and successfully insisted—that it should then and thereafter mean impartial friendly and peaceful intercourse with all belligerents.

The circumstances were urgent and trying; more so than in any other case that has ever since been presented to this country. England and France were at war, and with each of them the United States had peculiar relations. This nation was divided into two factions. The more assertive and aggressive of the two was the pro-French group, because of gratitude for French aid in our Revolution and because of the inspiration of the French Revolution. Had that faction had its way, we should have become the actual ally of France, at war with England and much of the rest of Europe, and should have committed ourselves to the disastrous policy of being thereafter a party to all European intrigues and wars—defeating one of the prime objects for which this nation was founded. Jefferson's subsequent policy of honest friendship with all and entangling alliances with none could not have been established, and the Monroe Doctrine could not have been proclaimed.

Happily, the judgment of Washington prevailed. There is no doubt that he was at heart a sympathizer with Great Britain as against France. But he was above all an American, and he had the prescience to perceive that the future welfare and, indeed, the integrity and perpetuity of America depended upon its complete detachment from the embroilments of Europe. It was, he held, vain to look for disinterested friendship or favors from one nation to another; a fact which our relations with France had already abundantly demonstrated; and he was not

inclined to sacrifice our "splendid isolation" to the selfish needs of any other Power. Therefore he insisted, against great opposition, upon laying for all time the corner-stone of our foreign policy, Neutrality.

So little was this understood at the time that many interpreted it as meaning non-intercourse with belligerents. It fell to Jefferson most effectually of all to dispel that error by making the first important declaration of our right as a neutral Power to maintain unaffected by war our impartial commerce with both belligerents, even to the extent of selling to them arms, ammunition, and other warlike supplies. These and all other articles contraband of war were of course to be subject to the liability of seizure on the high seas, but the right of our citizens to trade in them was not to be disputed.

The great policy thus founded was in time, as it is at present, seen to embrace three cardinal principles; in addition, of course, to that of non-participation in the wars of others. The first of these is impartiality. We are to treat all belligerents alike. We are to sell goods, including munitions of war, loan money, and have other relations with both alike. That attitude, or course, must, moreover, be subjective and not objective. That is to say, it must be adopted and maintained quite regardless of the ability of either belligerent to improve the opportunities offered by us. Thus, if of two belligerents one needs and wants to borrow money, and the other does not, the fact that the latter makes no loans of us is no reason for our declining to make loans to the former. Again, if one is able to receive and take home the arms and munitions which we sell to it, and the other, having lost command of the trade routes, is not able to do so, that difference must not be taken into account by us, and we must not refuse to sell to one because the other cannot take our goods. It is no fault and no business of ours that the latter cannot carry home its purchases. We are to be impartial without regard to either the desires or the abilities of the others.

The second principle is that of constancy of practice. The terms of the neutrality proclamation made at the beginning of a war must be maintained unaltered until its end. The necessity of this is obvious when we consider that any change would almost certainly be to the advantage of one of the belligerents over the other, because of the changes which might have occurred in their needs and conditions. Thus if at the beginning of a war we sell arms and ammunition impartially

to both, we must continue to do so to the end; since to change that policy and prohibit such traffic might be to favor the Power which no longer needed or no longer was able to secure such supplies, by injuring its antagonist which did need them and was able to take them. When terms of neutrality are proclaimed at the outbreak of a war, as they always should be, and are consistently maintained, both parties know what to depend upon, and the extent to which they are aided or hindered by our attitude is their own concern and none of ours.

The third principle is that, for the sake of self-protection, the lands and waters of the United States are not to be the scene of belligerent operations of any kind. That is the principle which forbids the building and equipment of warships for belligerents, as distinguished from the sale to them of munitions of war; and also which forbids enlistment here for foreign service. It is lawful for men, at their own risk, to go abroad and enlist there, for the militant act is thus performed outside of the borders of the United States. For them to enlist here, whether they are our own citizens or aliens, is illegal, because that would be to perform a militant act here, and to organize to that extent a belligerent force on American soil for operation against a Power with which we were at peace. Similarly it is lawful to sell munitions of war and ship them abroad, because they are not used, or capable of being used, in actual militancy until they are beyond our borders, being here treated as mere merchandise. But it would be unlawful to build and equip warships, because they would be instantly susceptible of belligerent action, within our waters, and would thus be tantamount to armed expeditions organized here. Whether this latter prohibition is properly to be applied to submarines which are constructed here in parts to be shipped abroad as merchandise and to be assembled there is an open question.

Neutrality must be reciprocal. It must be practised on the one hand, and must be respected on the other; and the two obligations are of equal force. Belligerents are bound inevitably, in return for the benevolent impartiality of the neutral, to respect the commercial and other rights of the neutral to the fullest extent that the recognized rules of war will permit. They must not interfere with the neutral's commerce, with themselves and with others; save in the seizure of contraband, the reasonable exercise of the right of search, the maintenance of an effective blockade, and the prohibition of traffic in coastal

areas which have been mined. Moreover, each belligerent must recognize the right of the neutral to trade with the other as freely as with itself.

To the belligerent, the obligations of the neutral are obvious, and they are invested with much force. To the neutral, also, the obligations of the belligerent are similarly obvious and forceful. But until millennial counsels of perfection prevail, it will probably never be possible for either party to recognize its own obligations quite as clearly as it does those of the other; and it is largely because of this inability that controversies arise as they have arisen in this present war.

The desire for commercial gain on the one side and the passionate determination on the other not to lose a single point in the grim game of war lead to strange inconsistencies. It is said, for example, that the British Government practically concedes that it has committed infringements upon American commercial rights, but promises to make atonement in the form of indemnities at the end of the war. Yet is not that precisely analogous to the conduct of Germany toward Belgium, which Britons never weary of denouncing as wholly evil? Germany, the British say, demanded of Belgium that she should acquiesce in the violation of her neutrality by the passage of German troops for the invasion of France, promising in return to make a satisfactory cash indemnity at the close of the war. It is difficult to see any material difference between that and the violation of American mercantile neutrality under a like promise.

We still doubt that any belligerents will in the present case go so far as to provoke war with us. Nor will American passions rise as high as they did in 1812. All parties have learned much since those days, and will be governed by that knowledge. It will be well, however, for Americans to remember how gravely we resented contraband trading when this country was at war; and to recognize, also, the fact that all attempts at illicit trade, whether successful or not, are an offense and a menace to lawful commerce. Every such attempt gives additional provocation to and justification of that exercise of the right of search which is always unwelcome and often odious.

We may hope, too, that Great Britain will bear in mind not only the lessons of the past, but also and equally the needs of the present, conspicuous if not paramount among which is the need of moral sympathy such as may be extended without violation of neutrality. There can be no question that American sympathy has thus far been largely given to that country

and its allies; and that this has been done largely because of what is believed to have been a gross violation of Belgium's neutrality. Nothing could more surely induce a waning of that sympathy than for the Allies themselves to violate the rights of neutrals. He who seeks equity must come into court with clean hands; and the Powers which seek approval as champions of neutral rights must themselves be scrupulous observers of those rights.

It is not without deliberation and heed for the future that we have set forth dispassionately the position which our Government should and, we have little doubt, will maintain successfully. Fortunately we have a President whose understanding of the situation was demonstrated immediately upon the outbreak of the war, and never more accurately than in his admirable statement following the sinking of the *Lusitania*. All this country wants is peace with honor. If Germany should consider the dragging of the United States into the war advantageous to herself, her every act since July indicates clearly enough that she will not be debarred from doing so by any consideration of morals, of civilization, or of humanity. But unless the ruling autocracy has gone utterly mad such a consummation is simply inconceivable.

What nonsense to assume that the most resourceful nation on earth would not be a serious factor; that need of munitions for our own use would prevent us from continuing to supply the Allies; that violent action enforced upon us against our obvious will would have no effect upon Italy and other neutrals; and that— But why recount an array of absurdities?

The simple fact is that from the moment a state of war should be declared between Germany and the United States every sane mind in as well as out of Germany would realize that at the least Germany could never win. Her back would be against the wall; her angry face turned in hopeless desperation toward the entire united world. Elsewhere we speculate upon the possibilities of the existing warfare, which clearly include a drawn battle; but this new contingency would leave no room whatever for doubt. Germany would be crushed surely and absolutely at some time or other—and much sooner than is supposed by those who reason that because America is not prepared she is not capable. The Kaiser must know this, and so, children in statecraft though they have shown themselves, and fools in conduct though they proved themselves when they wantonly murdered American citizens, must his arrogant advisers.

We anticipate neither war nor humiliation. The Government at Washington "still lives" and is in faithful keeping. A more dependable President than Mr. Wilson could not be desired; a more effective advocate of tolerant calmness than Mr. Bryan cannot be named; a wiser counselor than Mr. Lansing does not exist. It is a thrice blessed country.

Peace, then, pray God, let us have with honor; but if war shall be thrust upon us, let it be made clear to all the world that we fight only for the inalienable right of peace-loving peoples to live their own good lives in their own better ways!

## CAN GERMANY BE BEATEN?

*(From THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for September, 1914)*

What basis of reason is there in the common assumption that this will be a short war? It is inconceivable that Germany shall triumph, and it is no less incredible that she will hasten her own discomfiture. Never before in the history of the world has a nation so fully equipped technically and so strong in ultimate resource engaged in a struggle for existence. The reverses reported to date are slight at best, and in their sobering effect are probably working to advantage among the German people. Once let them realize to the full that their fight is less for the throne than for the Fatherland and their homes and families, and no limit can be placed upon their capacity for courage, endurance, and sacrifice. Our own revolutionists, the Boers, and the Belgians have left no room for doubt that one patriot defending his country is the equal of three members of an attacking force. Surely the Emperor and his advisers need no information on this score, and to anticipate that they will not shape a policy to put their antagonists in the light of aggressors is to question their intelligence. Hence we regard the heralded prospective great and decisive battle as a mirage. It may not take place in a year or in three years. Since meeting with unexpected resistance in Belgium the German army seemingly has settled down to cautious but insistent and scientific campaigning and, according even to prejudiced reports, is slowly but surely forcing its way forward in pursuance of a well-designed plan which contemplates protracted conflict. The French and Russian forces are proceeding along the same lines, and the British navy can do only patrol work till the Kaiser gives the word for battle. Even though the present total cost of the war does exceed twenty millions a day, there exists no certainty and, to our mind, little probability, that it will not continue for many months.

TEN months have elapsed since these words were written, and the situation is substantially unchanged. Millions of



lives have been sacrificed and billions of money have been squandered, but no invading foe has placed foot upon German soil, and no reversal at arms has served to temper the German spirit. The anticipated disaffection of Socialists and peace-seekers has failed to materialize. The mighty military machine seems only to have hardened into a yet greater efficiency. Prussia still dominates the empire, and the certainty of quick triumph which at first possessed the minds of her people has been supplanted by a determination never to be beaten which is even more formidable. There is no lack of money or munitions of war; new submarines are being built in greater numbers and more rapidly than by the Allies; despite pretenses to the contrary for political effect, food is plentiful and exceptional harvests seem assured; briefly, the possibility of conquering Germany is more remote to-day than it was at the beginning of the war. To feign the contrary is to ignore the facts.

The bitter truth is that in all large essentials the hopes of the Allies have been dissipated one after another. France was to occupy her lost provinces forthwith; she is still fighting defensively upon her own soil. Unprepared Britain was to raise and train an immense army for service in Flanders. Time was "fighting for the Allies." The real war was to begin in May. In point of fact, it began earlier at Neuve Chapelle, where apparent victory was made appallingly disastrous by incompetent British generalship, and June finds Germany a steady gainer in the past six weeks.

At last—and in this there may lie a gleam of hope—England is beginning to realize that she cannot reasonably expect to "muddle through." Hateful conscription seems to have become an inevitable necessity. The lower classes are far from enthusiastic; thousands are reconciled to the betterment of their hard lot through the war-time increases in wages; workmen are either scarce or unwilling to perform their part. The Government is trying to hold itself up by its boot-straps.

"Though I admire the ability of both Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George," said Lord Derby, bluntly, "I almost wish they had taken a different line and had been not quite so optimistic as they were. Mr. Asquith's speech gave one the impression that, so far as munitions of war were concerned, all was well. I say emphatically that all is not well, and the best commentary on the Prime Minister's speech is that when he visited the Elswick works of Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth, & Company next day it is reported that he went through

the shops fitted with machinery ready to turn out munitions of war, but that those shops were standing idle because there were not men available in sufficient numbers to work them."

To Lloyd George's assurance that little further anxiety need be felt regarding high explosives, the *Spectator* says, warningly:

Probably he meant to use this expression in its strict and narrow sense, but it has been taken to refer to artillery ammunition generally. The result is that people have been asking why the Government at one and the same time ask for a tremendous effort and use optimistic terms such as those employed by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We have ourselves no doubt that the true position is that a much greater and much more sustained effort is required than that we have yet made, and that if we do not organize ourselves for that effort we may at any moment find ourselves in deadly peril.

"Ministers may say what they please," curtly adds the military correspondent of the *Times*, "but the offensive of our army in France has been hampered for want of artillery ammunition in the sense that continuous operations have not been practicable until now, and there is not a man in the army who is not aware of the fact. So far as we are concerned, the main issues of the war will be fought out in the principal theater where our main armies now stand. The more troops we have in this principal theater, the longer the line that our troops can hold, and the larger the number of French troops that we shall free for an offensive elsewhere. It is altogether a fallacy to suppose that the French do not need, and will not welcome, every man that we can send. The period of great and decisive operations in the principal theater is close at hand. It finds us with six other campaigns on our hands, all needing men and ammunition. Some reputations may suffer when we are able to examine the conduct of this campaign by the Cabinet, but reputations will suffer most if our armies in the principal theater prove unequal to their mission, and if it is proved that, after fully satisfying all the claims of home defense, we are withholding from Sir John French armies which might be sent to him. There is scarcely a man in our armies in France who does not ask daily when the new armies are coming out, and there is no one who is able to give a satisfactory reply. England is literally crammed with troops at the moment when decisive operations in the Western theater are imminent, and if our operations are not successful the blame will lie with the Cabinet and nowhere else." In other words, Time fought not for the

Allies, but for Germany, which availed herself of the opportunity afforded by the passing of six months of comparative inaction.

Where the great British fleet is or what it is doing except to bury itself in barnacles nobody knows. It is now generally conceded that adequate preparation for the futile attack upon the forts of the Dardanelles had not been made and the ships lost were sacrificed to no purpose. The deadly German wasps circumnavigate the British Isles without let or hindrance. Already ninety-one merchantmen and trawlers have been sent to the bottom, and, despite official warnings from the German Government, there could not be or at any rate there was not spared from the great number of warships a single convoy for the doomed *Lusitania*. Is it to be wondered at that the *Westliche Post* should declare that "never before has the futility of the British navy been exposed so pitifully," and that Dr. Eugene Kuhnemann, one of our "Exchange German Professors," should add, exultingly, that "the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* proves two things: First, that Germany is determined and has the power to crush any nation that tries to starve her out; second, that the prestige of the English navy is gone for ever"?

England owes the long continuance of her pre-eminence as a world Power to a proficiency in diplomacy which is without parallel in history. "From early times down to the present day," in the oddly naïve words of the *Times*, she "has constantly proclaimed and taken as the basis of her foreign policy the political dogma of the balance of power, and she has always succeeded ultimately in attaining her object by forming coalitions of the various States whose independence was threatened by the ambitious aggressor." It was in pursuance of this far-seeing scheme of self-protection that King Edward effected the *entente cordiale* with France and subsequently, as a natural sequence, established a basis of understanding, so far as Germany was concerned, with the formerly distrusted Romanoffs. The prudence of this arrangement was manifested immediately upon Germany's invasion of Belgium, when it became evident, again quoting the *Times*, that "never was the necessity of such a defensive coalition more necessary than at the present moment, when a German Napoleon has appeared on the stage, clad in shining armor, brandishing his mailed fist, and claiming for himself, as by right divine, the trident which has been so long in the hand of Britannia." Whether or not England would have felt constrained to enter the conflict but for this anchor

to windward, there can be no question that her statesmen anticipated immeasurable benefits from the diversion of German troops by Russia. Whenever doubts arose respecting the progress of the Western campaign there remained satisfactory contemplation of the onrush of hordes from the colossus of the North, and for a time the hopeful expectation seemed likely to be realized. One by one the Austrian armies were overwhelmed, and the climax came with the fall of Przemsyl, compared with which, remarked the *Times* with obvious relief, "no event since the battle of the Marne has caused so much and universal rejoicing in this country, because it was seen that Russia's pathway in Galicia was cleared at last and that with the coming of spring her victorious armies would be enabled to move onward." But gradually "it was understood, at first somewhat vaguely, that in many respects Russia was unprepared and that she was suffering from a shortage of munitions of war hardly less serious than our own," and that consequently her progress "must inevitably be slow." The fact is that the coming of spring marked a sudden revivification of the Austrian army, sharp and successful drives by the Germans in Poland, and general defeat of the Russians, accompanied by great losses of men, at all points. That a full year will be required to equip the army of the Czar with supplies essential to substantial advancement into German territory is now believed by those familiar with existing conditions.

But it was only a question of time when Italy would "come in" and, following, Rumania and perhaps other Balkan States—then Germany surely would be "crushed." Suffice it to say that the event so earnestly desired continues to rest upon rumor alone and seems to be further and further removed.

It is still, as we said ten months ago, "inconceivable that Germany shall triumph," but it is no less certain, from the standpoint of the Allies, that the prospect is laden with gloom and foreboding and that the end is afar off.

## THE JAPANNING OF CHINA

IN spite of Mr. Kipling's warning story about "a fool . . . who tried to hurry the East," events move more rapidly in the Orient than in the Occident. Our own continent has been in tribulation over Mexico for a couple of years, and Europe, after ten months of warfare, seems to be "getting no forrarder"

toward an end which may yet be years away. But Japan, beginning operations later than the European belligerents, has already driven Germany from all her holdings in Asia, and in the course of five months has established such a measure of suzerainty over the Chinese Republic as never has been effected or even dreamed of by any other power in the history of the Celestial Empire. This Japan has done by taking advantage of the complications in Europe—she never would have ventured or have been permitted to do it if the European Powers had not been fully occupied with affairs at home—and by taking a leaf out of the European book in the way of regarding a treaty as a mere “scrap of paper.” Opportunism and imitativeness have ever been characteristic traits of the Japanese national character.

We shall the more fully appreciate the present situation if we recall the former relations of the two countries concerned. China traditionally regarded Japan with contempt, and this feeling was little if at all abated by the war of 1894, since the bulk of the Chinese Empire was unaffected by that struggle and did not apprehend its significance. Not until the suppression of the Boxer outbreak, in 1900, did any considerable change occur. In the occupation of the Forbidden City by foreigners and the flight of the Manchu Court to Sian-fu, the Chinese Empire suffered the greatest humiliation it had ever known; and the crowning feature of that humiliation was the fact that the hated and despised Japanese were among the conquering invaders, marching by the side of and esteemed as the equals of the Europeans. That was not only humiliation for China. It was unspeakable exaltation for Japan. Five years before a combination of three great European Powers had reminded her of her intrinsic and irremediable inferiority to them, in denying her the lawful spoils of war. Now those same Powers treated her as an equal, while still emphasizing the inferiority of China. Practically, by the decree of Europe and America, Japan was invested with the moral hegemony of the Yellow Race. In that proud status Japan was presently confirmed by three further events: The war with and victory over Russia, the annexation as a Japanese province of that Kingdom of Korea which had been a dependency of China, and the treaty of alliance with Great Britain.

Japan naturally “felt her oats.” But she was as wary as she was ambitious. It would have been folly to challenge European antagonism by moving against China in normal

times. But the moment the great war engaged the attention of all the important Powers of Europe, she moved to work her will upon China, unafraid of any intervention. The first thing was to drive Germany out of Kiao-chao and thus out of the whole province of Shan-tung. This was done plausibly, as an ally of Great Britain. Probably the British and French forces in Asia could have done it themselves, but they acquiesced in and indeed welcomed Japan's aid, particularly since the latter country protested that she had no ulterior designs. "Japan has no territorial ambitions," said Count Okuma; "her warlike operations will not extend beyond defense of her own legitimate interests. . . . Japan has no ulterior motive, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess." Probably Count Okuma was quite sincere. But he was a civilian and not a member of one of the great military clans; and he was Prime Minister on sufferance, the actual majority of the Parliament being against him and thus able to dictate policies over his head. However, the world generally took his declarations at their face value and assumed that after driving the Germans out of Shan-tung Japan would undo the former German conquest by restoring that province in its entirety to China.

Japan's different purpose, however, soon appeared. Immediately after the expulsion of the Germans from Tsing-tau the Chinese Government prepared to resume the administration of that place. From doing so it was prevented by the Japanese, who appointed their own custom-house and other local authorities, took possession of the Shan-tung Railroad and other properties, which really belonged to a private Chino-German company, and generally treated the province as spoils of war. Baron Sakatani, formerly Finance Minister and now Mayor of Tokio, publicly and with much approval urged that a Japanese civil government should be established at Tsing-tau, "to manage and develop Shan-tung." Other representative and influential public men made similar utterances, and it became apparent that the Germans had been ousted only to let the Japanese take their place.

This was explicitly declared on January 18 last, when Japan made upon China her notorious twenty-one demands; which were to be kept secret until granted, under penalty of having other and harsher ones added to them. Those demands have since been modified in some respects, but the chief of them has remained unchanged, and has now been granted by China

under pressure. That was, and is, that Japan shall succeed to all the rights, privileges, and powers which Germany had in the Province of Shan-tung. As Germany secured her status there by sheer force and conquest, it seems to be no exaggeration to say that Japan has taken Shan-tung from China as spoils of war. At least she has done so "once removed"—she has taken from Germany as spoils of war that which Germany similarly took from China. To paraphrase a familiar proverb, the beneficiary and successor of the conqueror is as bad as the conqueror.

The chief points of the modified demands which Japan has made, and which China has granted, may be briefly stated. Japan completely succeeds Germany in Shan-tung, and that extensive, populous, and opulent province becomes a Japanese protectorate. The exceptional significance of that is seen on the map. Japan already possesses the Regent's Sword Peninsula, so that the acquisition of Shan-tung gives her control of both sides of the entrance to the Gulf of Pe-chi-li—practically of the gulf itself and of the approaches by sea to Tientsin and to Peking itself. She has the capital of China by the throat. Again, in Southern Manchuria a Japanese protectorate is established, under which Japan is to have the exclusive control of the police and also the option of all foreign loans and of all railroad-building. In Eastern or Inner Mongolia—Outer Mongolia having been appropriated by Russia—another Japanese protectorate is established, under which Japan is to control all foreign railroad loans and all foreign loans of any kind which are to be met by taxation, and is also to designate the treaty ports which are to be opened. If China needs foreign advisers in governmental affairs, she is to get them from Japan. She is to purchase most of her military arms and other supplies from Japan, or is to let Japan build arsenals in China for their manufacture. In Fu-kien Province, facing Formosa, China is to grant no other Power than Japan any concession for a ship-yard, coaling-station, or similar establishment, and is to permit no private establishment of the kind to be created with foreign capital.

It will now be pertinent and instructive to compare these stipulations with the terms of some previous agreements to which Japan and China have been parties. In 1899 John Hay, our Secretary of State, secured the adherence of Japan, along with other nations, to his principle of "an open door and equality of opportunity" for all nations in China. In 1907 Japan and

Russia agreed "to recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in the said empire," and they engaged "to uphold and defend the respect of that principle by all the peaceful means possible to them." In 1908 Japan and the United States agreed "to preserve the common interests of the Powers in China, by supporting by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China, and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire." In 1911 Japan and Great Britain agreed upon "the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." Finally, there is the "most favored nation" clause in all the treaties between China and other Powers, which declares that the country making each treaty shall have "free and equal participation in all privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been or may hereafter be granted" by the Chinese Government to any other nation.

It would be interesting to see compatibility and harmony demonstrated between these treaty stipulations and obligations and the agreement which Japan is now imposing upon China. Japanese jugglers are the most dexterous in the world, and it may be that some deft and plausible casuist could make it appear that for Japan to have exclusive privileges in a large and important part of China is the same as for all nations to have equal opportunities there. "Logic is logic," said Dr. Holmes. But the delegation of insistent Missourians demanding to be shown is numerous, and in the absence of a far more convincing "Q. E. D." than has yet appeared they will think that the "scrap of paper" business has had a flagrant analogue in the Far East, as a result of which the world is likely soon to be confronted with a reorganized and awakened China under Japanese control or else a practical partitioning of China between Japan and Russia. If so, the other Powers concerned, as treaty parties, may or may not make more effective protest than they did to the tearing up of the treaty which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. Eastern Asia and Western Europe are a long way apart.



## OUR COLONEL AT HIS BEST

THE United States of America is a large body of land bounded on the north by fishing, on the east by fighting, on the south by anarchy, and on the west by rumors of trouble. Its inhabitants are divided into two classes—"the People" and "Roosevelt and Bryan," both perennial. Its government is of, for, and by the former, as unremittingly elucidated by the latter. Presidents come and go, political parties rise and fall, issues spring like mushrooms from the fertile soil, only to be supplanted by others, which, too, in turn, wither under the burning sun; but our unarmed citizenry is imperishable, and Roosevelt and Bryan can never say die. It is fitting, then, that this venerable journal should signalize the beginning of its second cycle with due recognition of the simultaneous reappearance upon the first pages of our public prints of these our most cherished heralds of variegated evangels, lest nothing of note should be omitted from the pages of historical romance.

Although it is a matter of common understanding that the one is a warrior and the other a pacifist, both are Colonels and both Crusaders. At the moment two demons engage their respective energies—the Demon Boss and the Demon Rum. When these shall have been demolished others will arise in response to call; but sufficient unto the day are the dragons thereof; let the fascinating present transfix our attention.

Great was the popular rejoicing when our more admired but less beloved Colonel was haled into court by one Barnes, descended from Belial and designated by an imaginative witness as Nero the ruthless fiddler. The people were wearied by tales of slaughter and eager for diversion such as might tend to relieve the tedium of psychological depression. Their interest in the aggressive plaintiff, we take it, was not excessive. Even the report that he was a Harvard man evoked hardly more excitement than the suspicion that he was also a bad man, so comparatively common have both become in recent years. Some, indeed, so we have been told, assumed that because he was a plaintiff his name was Bardwell and they continued in this belief until they were informed in due course that formerly it was Jekyll, but now it was Hyde. In any case, the people wanted a Hero, not a Nero—and they suffered no disappointment.

We have never concerned ourselves greatly over the name

of the Cuban hill which our militant Colonel ascended, nor as to whether he climbed on foot or on horseback; the main point, it always seemed to us, was that, wherever he arrived and however he got there, he thereby demonstrated the possession of exceptional strategic capacity. Unlike others less observant, therefore, we were not surprised when at the very outset, although for the first time in his long and active career upon fields of battle, he promptly *assumed the defensive*, thus obtaining the advantage of the first and fullest light from the lime—as pretty an example of tactical skill as we can recall.

Technically the case was that of one Barnes, alias Jekyll, alias Hyde, alias Nero, *et al.*, plaintiff, against Our Colonel, defendant, for having uttered a libel when he said that there was an “all-powerful invisible government which is responsible for the maladministration and corruption in the public offices of the State”; that this invisible government exists through the co-operation between the leaders of supposed rival parties—that “the interests of Mr. Barnes and Mr. Murphy are fundamentally identical, and that when the issue between popular rights and corrupt and machine-ruled government is clearly drawn the two bosses will always be found fighting on the same side openly or covertly, giving one another such support as can with safety be rendered.”

The sole question was whether the facts could be held to justify this portrayal. Was the plaintiff the type of person thus depicted? If so, no libel had been uttered; if not, he could recover damages. That was all. But did Our Colonel propose to contribute a fortnight or more of valuable time to an investigation of the proclivities of one Barnes? Hardly! If any character was to be diagnosed, it should be one worth considering; in a word, his own. If anybody was to be tried, it should be himself. If wrong-doing were charged, it should be against him; if righteousness were to prevail, it should be his righteousness. He was no Nero playing second fiddle; he was a Hero accustomed to lead the orchestra and accept the plaudits of the multitude. His primary obligation was to gratify the audience, not to win a trumpery libel suit. Who really cared whether the morals of one insignificant Barnes were good, bad, or indifferent? Why investigate a person when a personage was at hand? There could be but one answer to these pertinent queries. And so it came about that Our Colonel climbed promptly into the high chair, grinned happily, and said with glee:

"Now turn on your X-rays!"

The self-revelation which ensued occupied so much time and filled so many columns that even the President, who for some reason seemed to be really interested in the proceedings, smilingly confessed to a sense of bewilderment when asked for an opinion, and the duller-witted writers of editorials threw up their hands in despair. Nevertheless, the more salient points are sufficiently clear. Did Our Colonel wish to become Governor of New York after he had conquered Spain? He did. Could he have hoped to realize that praiseworthy ambition without the co-operation of the Republican political machine? Assuredly not.

"At that time," continued Mr. Ivins, "you knew of Mr. Platt's reputation as the leader or boss of the party in this State?"

"As the boss of the party in this State, yes," said Mr. Roosevelt.

"And you deliberately, by agreement, met him for the purpose of discussing your nomination at the coming convention by the Republican party?"

"I did."

A telling point! suggested the learned counsel. But the gentlemen of the jury did not seem to be shocked. Perhaps they recalled that our pacific Colonel, when seeking one of the various elections to which he has aspired, took Mr. Charles F. Murphy to his capacious bosom, and that even our present Chief Magistrate did upon occasion, in days gone by, "deliberately meet" the Hon. James Smith, Jr., for a precisely similar purpose. As observant American citizens, the jurymen were not unfamiliar with the ways of candidates who classify bosses with platforms as necessary means to highly worthy ends. Moreover, Our Colonel had already fixed his conditions through the well-known accelerator, Mr. Lemuel Eli Quigg, who reported with noticeable explicitness:

I told him [Senator Platt] that you said that you would like to be nominated; that you understood perfectly that if you were nominated it would be as a result of his support; that you were not the sort of man who would accept a nomination directly out of the hands of the organization without realization of the obligation, thereby assumed, to sustain the organization and to promote and uphold it, and that you were perfectly prepared to meet the obligation and to discharge it justly; that if you were Governor you would not wish to be anything else than Governor; that you would not wish to be a figurehead or to accept any position before the public or in your own mind which was not in keeping with the dignity of the office or which would not

allow you to discharge your duties in the light of your judgment and conscience, but that you would take the office, if at all, intending in good faith to act the part of his friend personally and politically; to acknowledge and respect his position as the head of the Republican organization and as the Republican Senator from the State of New York; that you would not be led into any factional opposition to the organization, but that, on the contrary, you would aim constantly to make its interests identical with the public interests; that you would consult with the Senator freely and fully on all important matters; that you would adopt no line of policy and agree to no important matter or nomination without previous consultation, and that you wanted him to agree to the same thing on his part, so that both you and he could meet in consultation with minds free and open, each intending to reach a conclusion satisfactory to both and in that to preserve absolute harmony in the organization and among the supporters of the party.

I told him that you said that you did not mean by this that you would do everything that was wanted precisely as it might be originally suggested, but that you did mean in good faith and honest friendship to enter with him upon the consideration of all matters proposed, without prejudice and with the intention to reach a conclusion which the Senator no less than yourself would deem wisest and best.

To this Mr. Roosevelt replied that this statement of his attitude was "substantially correct" and added:

I sha'n't try to go over your different sentences in detail; but, for instance, instead of saying that I did not "wish" to be a figurehead, you should have used the word "consent," and there are various similar changes, to which I think you will agree. . . . In short, I want to make clear that there was no question of pledges or promises, least of all a question of bargaining for the nomination; but that I promptly told you the position I would take if I was elected Governor and suggested what I thought it would be best for both Senator Platt and myself to do so as to prevent the chance of any smash-up which would be disastrous to the welfare of the party and equally disastrous from the standpoint of good government. I was not making any agreement as to what I would do on consideration that I received the nomination. I was stating the course which I thought it would be best to follow, for the sake of the party and for the sake of the State, both considerations outweighing infinitely the question of my own nomination.

—an answer which, while perhaps not wholly unexceptionable, is far more creditable than the public had been led to expect. In a word, the candidate accepted the nomination from the boss with full appreciation of his obligation and with promise

of due recognition, but without surrendering his own right of ultimate decision—a position which, it must be admitted in fairness to Mr. Roosevelt, he maintained consistently while serving as Governor of his State.

The examination continued:

“You know what a boss is?”

“I do.”

“Is it not a fact that they dictated those nominations?”

“Unquestionably,” replied the Colonel, with a grin that took the sting out of the question.

Mr. Ivins wanted to know if it had been the Colonel’s intention to stand by Platt and Odell.

“As long as they went straight,” he shot back.

Q.—You took it for granted that they would go straight, didn’t you? A.—At that time they showed every symptom of it. Mr. Parker had been elected the year before, and the machine was in a chastened attitude.

“Did you during that campaign attack machine politics of boss rule?” asked Mr. Ivins.

The Colonel said he didn’t, because bossism wasn’t an issue then, and there was no feeling against it in the shape of an independent movement.

“Then you do not attack anything unless there is a feeling against it?”

“I attack iniquities,” the Colonel came back. “I attack wrongdoing. I try to choose the time for an attack when I can get the bulk of the people to accept the principles for which I stand. I believe that you can only accomplish reforms of a permanent character when you can educate the people up to the point of standing by them.”

Mr. Ivins wanted to know if the Colonel always stood for righteousness, but with an eye on opportunity. The Colonel said it was necessary always to stand for righteousness, “just exactly as I did while I was Governor.”

Whether or not, in standing invariably for righteousness, he kept one eye upon opportunity, the witness omitted to say. That he would have replied in the affirmative, if at all, we have little doubt. And he might have added: Why not? It is good for the people that I should serve them, because I am pure and true. Logically I must put myself in the way of performing my duty. If it becomes necessary to consort with the wicked in order to gain my point I have no hesitation in doing so, because I cannot be contaminated. Others, as a rule, combine the attributes of Jekyll and Hyde, but I am exclusively Jekyll. I would not even appoint Hyde Minister to France. I do not

have to consider whether I am right or wrong. I am invariably right. I could not be otherwise. I am grateful to those who aid me, because thereby they prove their faith in righteousness and their possession of an exalted spirit. Money contributed in my behalf is as surely sanctified as if bestowed upon the Y. M. C. A. I recognize no obligation which conflicts with the public good, but I would never repudiate a friend until his unworthiness had been clearly established. I am both a servant of God and an American man. Take me or leave me.

This is the Roosevelt creed as emphasized, to his intense delight, in this ridiculous trial for libel. In part it is not novel; as a whole it is the unique possession of our most vivid living personality. So let it be stamped indelibly upon the pages of our history!

## RAILROAD POSTAL RATES

THE controversy between the Post-office Department and the railroads is in a way reminiscent of the classic problem concerning the impingement of an irresistible force upon an immovable body. In the latter case it is quite obvious that something highly interesting must happen. Either the force must cease to be irresistible or the body must cease to be immovable, or both. In the former case, which is just now of much pertinence, there must apparently be a similar result. Either the Post-office Department must admit that the railroads are not "looting the postal revenues" or the railroads must admit that the Government is not "robbing the railroads," or both.

The origin of the controversy was in the exigencies of the post-office budget. A few years ago that budget was made to balance and even to show a considerable balance of profit, for the first time at least in many years. But with the establishment of the parcel post there was menace of the old deficit, and this was all the more unwelcome because of the probability of a deficit in the general national budget. Had there been assured a considerable revenue surplus, out of which the postal deficit might be met, it would have mattered little. But in the circumstances actually existing retrenchment and economy became indispensable. Something was accomplished by reduction of forces in post-offices and by curtailment of rural free-delivery services. But these were not enough, and a more important

saving was sought through a sweeping reduction of the payments made to the railroads for carrying the mails.

The argument for such reduction seems plausible from one point of view. It can scarcely be challenged that the railroads ought to do carrying for the Government as cheaply as for any one else. But, says the Post-office Department, they are not doing so; they are getting about twice as much for carrying mail matter as for first-class express matter. To demonstrate this, figures are cited. Railroads get \$1.20 a hundred pounds for carrying express matter from New York to Chicago, and for carrying the mails over the same route they get \$2.58. If that were all there were to be said about it the statement would be conclusive. But it is not all.

The rate on a hundred pounds by express from New York to Chicago, as given, is the rate on a single package of that weight and of moderate bulk. The rate on a hundred pounds of mail matter is the rate on a large number of packages, perhaps a score, perhaps a hundred, occupying, because of their number and nature, a much larger space than the single express package. If the hundred pounds of expressage were in a score or a hundred separate packages the rate on them would be much more than on the mail matter; and even if they were all inclosed in a single bag or crate, if their bulk were much larger than that of the single package, the charge on them would be higher. It would be absurdly unjust to expect a railroad to convey a package ten feet square for the same price as one only one foot square, even though the one were filled with feathers and the other with lead, and thus both weighed the same.

Moreover, the Government itself has from the beginning established the principle of much higher rates for the transportation of certain classes of mail matter than for express matter. It carries locally ten pounds of express matter in a single package for ten cents, while for ten pounds of sealed letters, or even a single ten-pound package sealed, it charges \$3.20, or thirty-two times as much. It might, then, be reasonably contended that the railroads should receive a higher rate for carrying first-class mail than for carrying express matter. If, moreover, it be argued that they should carry express matter for the Government—parcel-post matter—for the same rates as for express companies, it may be replied that in that case the same rules should be applied concerning the ratio between weight and bulk. Postal matter averaging much more bulk than express matter in proportion to its weight, there is good ground for the insist-

ence that the space occupied should be taken into account as well as the mere weight of matter carried, in computing the just compensation.

At any rate, the controversy is one which should be discussed and disposed of in a seemly manner, through computations on a business basis, and not through the calling of hard names. It is not edifying for the largest department of the Government service and the second largest industry in the country to charge each other with being thieves.

## ARE "PUBLIC DEFENDERS" NEEDED?

"PUBLIC DEFENDER" is a misnomer. The phrase might properly be applied to an existing officer, since it is the function of the Attorney-General, the Corporation Counsel, or whom-ever else, to defend the State or the municipality—which is the public—in suits which are brought against it, as well as to prosecute in its behalf suits against offenders. But that is by no means the intent of the phrase in the agitation which is now being waged for the creation of an entirely new office, to wit: An attorney, elected by the public and paid by the public, who shall defend those against whom suits are brought by the public prosecutor. Such a "Public Defender" would obviously not be a defender of the public, nor a defender in behalf of the public, but a private counsel or attorney provided by the public. It might of course be added that the "Public Prosecutor" is not a prosecutor of the public. No; but he is at least a prosecutor in behalf of the public, who owes his duty to the public which elects and pays him; while the "Public Defender" would owe his duty to the opponent of that public.

Hair-splitting over names apart, however, it is obvious that there is something to be said both for and against the marked innovation in our jurisprudence which is thus proposed and which has actually been adopted in one or two places. There is indisputable need in some cases for such an officer, and indeed it is a not uncommon thing for one to be temporarily appointed by the court. When an entirely impecunious person is brought to the bar for trial, it is rightly recognized that his lack of means must not deprive him of the services of counsel, and so some one is assigned by the court to defend him, and a reasonable remuneration is made to such counsel from the public funds. There are also cases in which the defendants are



strangers who, whether they are or are not able to pay for the services, are insufficiently acquainted with the local bar to choose discriminatingly, and are therefore glad to have the court suggest or designate counsel to defend their rights.

It is argued that these circumstances prove the desirability of having a public officer elected to serve in all such cases, precisely as the public prosecutor is elected to serve in them on the other side. Such an election would assure the readiness of a suitable attorney in every case of need, and it would preclude the suspicion of personal favoritism which sometimes arises when the designation of counsel is left to the presiding judge. Upon their face these arguments seem strong. Deeper scrutiny gives them, however, a less convincing aspect.

There is a radical fallacy in assuming an analogy to exist between the public prosecutor and the public defender. As a matter of fact, there is none. The public prosecutor has the public for his client; the public defender would have for his client an individual adversary of the public. In the one case the public chooses some one to protect its interests; in the other it would choose some one to attack them. It is not an analogy; it is an anomaly.

Each party to a suit has a right to select his own counsel. That right is fundamental. In electing a public prosecutor the public does choose its own counsel. But if it elects a public defender, and insists that the man whom it prosecutes shall accept him, it thus denies that right to the defendant, and compels him to accept counsel selected not by himself, but by his adversary. A more extraordinary situation could not easily be conceived. A defendant might have a legitimate objection to the public defender, and cause for doubting the fidelity or efficiency of his services. In such a case it would be an intolerable hardship to impose that functionary upon him against his will.

These actual or possible objections to the elected public defender do not obtain against the appointment of counsel by the court. For such counsel is selected not by the opposing party to the suit, but by an impartial authority, who inclines no more to the prosecution than to the defense. Moreover, there is room for the exercise of discretion. If the defendant has valid cause for dissatisfaction with the counsel at first selected by the judge, the judge is ready to substitute another. It is also possible for the court to select counsel specially suited by temperament and experience for the special case in hand,

and thus to assure the defendant really better service than he would be likely to receive from a stated public functionary.

There is doubt, too, whether in most courts there are enough cases requiring assigned counsel to warrant the creation of such an office. Certainly it would be deplorable to encourage the multiplication of causes *in forma pauperis*. Whether an acquitted and vindicated defendant should be recouped by the State for the cost to which the State has put him by its prosecution of him, is an open question, of which more may some time be heard. It would be better that this should be done than that the cost of all defenses should be thrown upon the State, and that the State should be put into the paradoxical position of selecting and subsidizing both its champion and its adversary.

## THE MYSTERY OF MYTHS

The Turtle Bay yarn has gone aglimmering! So we might have expected, with confidence born of frequent observation and of long experience. And over that happy release from fearsomeness we might rejoice and be glad, were it not for the haunting conviction that about to-morrow, or at least the day after, we shall have another blithe and brazen myth bob up serenely, to be a nine days' wonder alike of mendacity and of credulity. It is now fourscore years, lacking one, since *Travels of Baron Roorbach* appeared, but never in that time has the trail of impudent tarradiddles been permitted to grow old.

Note the flagrancy of the Myth of Turtle Bay. "I saw them there," distinctly declared the deft narrator. He saw five Japanese warships and six colliers and supply-ships. He saw four thousand Japanese marines and sailors in occupation of Turtle Bay—four thousand; count them! He saw that the harbor was mined. He saw that there was a wireless telegraphic plant in operation. He saw that Japanese patrol-ships were guarding the approaches to the harbor, while armed men and stores of ammunition were being landed at the military camp ashore. He saw sixty tons of ammunition landed. He saw hundreds of sailors armed with rifles daily marching from some place behind the camp down to the beach. "*Quæque ipse miserrima vidi.*"

But "mark, now, how plain a tale shall put you down." Official scrutiny swiftly followed the promulgation of this startling story, with the result that the great armada was re-

solved into one Japanese naval ship run fast aground, one repair-ship, one supply-ship, two fishing-schooners, and two fishing-boats. The other four ships, the colliers, the thousands of armed men, the camp, the wireless telegraphy, the patrols, the sixty tons of ammunition, "all gonéd afay mit de lager beer, afay in de Ewigkeit!"

How often have we heard that tale of the message "We are starving!" written under the postage stamps of letters from Germany, thus to escape the censor and to give to the world tidings of distress which otherwise would be suppressed. An innumerable company have heard of it from somebody else who actually saw it. Now and then even some one has declared that he himself saw it, saw the actual writing under the stamp; only, as it was some one's else letter, he could not show it in proof. Probably myriads have believed the story; but the world waits with amusement and patience mingled for some one actually to show a single envelope bearing such a message.

Then there were those Russian troops passing through Scotland and England. They were seen, positively and actually seen, by innumerable witnesses. Company, regiment, brigade, and corps, appearing first in Scotland, where they had doubtless been landed from vessels coming around the North Cape; trainload after trainload rushing southward; seen also in London streets, a whole army marching through the streets at night, from the station at which they landed from the Scottish trains to that at which they were to entrain for the nearest Channel port; and finally train after train laden with Cossacks, a train every ten minutes, all the night long, rushing down to the shore of the "Silver Streak." Of course the British were all too patriotic to tell of it, or even to pay any attention to it. Perhaps they all shut themselves in their houses as the Cossacks passed by, like the loyal folk of Coventry when Lady Godiva rode abroad. But the Peeping Tom who reported the thing saw it. He saw it with his own eyes. He timed the Russian-laden trains as they passed and noted the precision with which they went, one every ten minutes. The succession was kept up for so many hours, and each train consisted of so many cars, and each car contained so many men; wherefore a simple process in multiplication told how many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers had been landed in Northern France, thanks to Britain's control of the sea. But has one single, solitary soldier of them all materialized upon the plains of Flanders?

It is an old story—the Roorbach, the Munchausenism. We ourselves have heard, in days of youth, the story of those “sealed orders” under which the Russian fleet came to New York in 1863; sealed orders, which, if occasion had arisen for their opening, would doubtless have directed the Russian commander to place his ships and men at the disposal of the United States navy. We have heard of men who talked with the Russian Admiral, at the dinner in his honor at the Astor House, and who were told by him that he had such orders in his strong-box. Nay, we have heard of those who actually saw the orders—that is to say, the outside of the envelope in which they were sealed! Yet, strangely enough, neither at Washington nor at Petrograd has any official hint of the existence of such orders ever been disclosed.

Great is the mystery of the myth! Not that it exists, for man is an inventive and an imaginative creature, but rather that it so much persists, and that despite its recurring repudiation and the ridicule which falls upon it, there are never lacking multitudes of eager believers. If a companion piece to the Turtle Bay monstrosity were put forward to-morrow, still more extravagantly and impudently fictitious, it would probably command even more numerous and more excited believers than the original. Did we say that *Travels of Baron Roorbach* occurred nearly eighty years ago? Nay; Roorbach began his peregrinations when Adam told that first lie in Eden, and he is still marching on!

## MARK TWAIN'S WAR MAP

MARK TWAIN was editor of the *Buffalo Express* when the Germans were approaching Paris in 1870, and on September 17th of that year he published the interesting map of the fortifications, drawn by himself, which is reproduced on the following page.

The idea of this map [he wrote] is not original with me, but is borrowed from the *Tribune* and the other great metropolitan journals.

I claim no other merit for this production (if I may so call it) than that it is accurate. The main blemish of the city-paper maps of which it is an imitation is, that in them more attention seems paid to artistic picturesqueness than geographical reliability.

Inasmuch as this is the first time I ever tried to draft and engrave a map, or attempt anything in the line of art at all, the commendations the work has received and the admiration it has excited among the people, have been very grateful to my feelings. And it is touching



The reader will comprehend at a glance that that piece of river with the "High Bridge" over it got left out to one side by reason of a slip of the engraving-tool, which rendered it necessary to change the entire course of the River Rhine or else spoil the map. After having spent two days in digging and gouging at the map, I would have lost so much work.

I never had so much trouble with anything in my life as I did with this map. I had heaps of little fortifications scattered all around Paris, at first, but every now and then my instruments would slip and fetch away whole miles of batteries and leave the vicinity as clean as if the Prussians had been there.

The reader will find it well to frame this map for future reference, so that it may aid in extending popular intelligence and dispelling the wide-spread ignorance of the day.

MARK TWAIN.

#### OFFICIAL COMMENDATIONS.

It is the only map of the kind I ever saw.—U. S. Grant.

It places the situation in an entirely new light.—Bismarck.

I cannot look at it without shedding tears.—Brigham Young.

It is very nice large print.—Napoleon.

My wife was for years afflicted with freckles, and though everything was done for her relief that could be done, all was in vain. But, sir, since her first glance at your map, they have entirely left her. She has nothing but convulsions now.—J. Smith.

If I had this map I could have gone out of Metz without any trouble.—Bazaine.

I have seen a great many maps in my time, but none that this one reminds me of.—Trochu.

It is but fair to say that in some respects it is a truly remarkable map.—W. T. Sherman.

I said to my son Frederick William, "If you could only make a map like that, I would be perfectly willing to see you die—even anxious."  
—William III.

#### COMMENT

SECRETARY TUMULTY listened intently when Senator Hamilton Lewis said to the Democratic Club of New York:

I now make bold to say that President Wilson has never had in his mind the selfish object of taking a reward for the execution of his promises to the people by seeking renomination as a compensation or asking for re-election as a return for the discharge of his obligations to his party and his duty to his country.

Speaking of my own sentiments, I dare say that if the President can have all his policies to which he is pledged to the people executed into laws and could be then left to his free will, he not only would not be a candidate for re-election, but in justice to the sacred grief which has afflicted him, and the sweet and tender obligations which still rest upon him, would abandon public office for the private refuge of home, family, and friends.

He would be found, I am sure, pointing his countrymen to the fact that he has executed his pledges, given the nation the relief it sought, restored it to peace and security, put it upon the pathway of prosperity and progress, and then declined to take another term in office, that it may be evident before the world that what he did was for the cause of right and not for the hope of reward, and to demonstrate before the nation that a man can unselfishly serve his countrymen without having as the object of each action a return compensation.

Thus President Woodrow Wilson, if left to his own heart's emotion, would render up his office after his duty had been fulfilled, content in the compensation of his conviction that he had earned the approval of mankind and the blessings of his God.

"Not inspired," was Mr. Tumulty's sententious and emphatic comment in a tone indicative of disgust. We should say not—yet.

The rise and fall of the Progressive movement is indicated by the following record of recent off-year elections in Michigan:

	1911.	1913.	1915.
Republican.....	256,729	181,155	261,285
Democratic.....	123,204	133,848	116,863
Progressive.....		92,874	27,057
Socialist.....	17,057	20,369	14,529
Prohibition.....	13,837	7,814	10,943
Socialist Labor.....	3,727	2,295	.....
Scattering.....	198	3	.....
<hr/>			
Total.....	414,752	438,358	430,677
Plurality.....	133,525	47,307	144,422

In 1912 the vote was: Roosevelt, 214,584; Taft, 152,244; Wilson, 150,751. Obviously in this State the Progressive vote came wholly from the Republican Party and has returned to its former allegiance with virtual unanimity. Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson was elected in 1912 without the aid of Michigan, and some think he may be again.

LONDON, May 1.—Ambassador Walter Hines Page has barred liquors from his table during the war's duration, thus following the lead of King George.—*The Sun*.

Neutrality or economy?

Secretary of War Daniels.—*Buffalo Enquirer*.

Respectfully referred to the Hon. Lindley M. Garrison.

Opinions differ respecting the origin of the nearly forgotten Niagara Falls conference. Some say Director-General John Barrett first suggested it. Others ascribe the honor to Mr. Charles H. Sherrill, our former Minister to Argentina. In any case the latter adventures in the *Independent* the somewhat surprising conclusion that the outcome was a notable success. "Public opinion," he says, "has failed to prevent war in Europe or to stop its spread into Africa and Asia. The opposite is true on our side of the ocean. Organized public opinion, taking shape in the A B C mediation, has triumphantly succeeded in averting the possibility of war in this hemisphere. This successful outcome of what some thought mere visionary sentimentalism has had a great effect throughout the New World." To which the *Army and Navy Journal* rejoins:

Instead of the Niagara Falls conference "triumphantly succeeding in averting war," it seemed to let loose a new crop of bandits and political outlaws in Mexico, so that for months it was impossible to tell from the current news which man was the most promising leader in the Mexican internal warfare. But most marked of all, the A B C mediators, however successful they were in mediating among themselves, failed utterly as to Villa and Carranza, for those two estimable gentlemen, who before the Niagara Falls conference were as thick as two peas, have since the ending of the conference been trying to get a strangle hold on each other's neck. What is Mr. Sherrill's "triumphant mediation" worth when it makes two reformatory brethren like Villa and Carranza fall out and pour out more Mexican blood? Has there not been as much fighting in Mexico since the A B C conference as before? Is this to be the bloodless calm of peace ushered in by triumphant mediation all over the world? If so, we suggest our Army be increased at once to a million men and our Navy doubled as to battleships.

It seems to be hardly worth while to engage in this interesting controversy, but the misapprehension respecting the functions of the worthy gentlemen who participated in the



conference must not be permitted to stand. They were not mediators; they were meditators.

The man who lately declared that Yale University no longer existed as an institution of learning was ready to attribute her downfall partly to her president, whom he suspected was not a good college president.—EDWARD S. MARTIN in *Life*.

With felicitations to the distinguished grammarian whom we suspect was a Harvard, not a Yale, man.

I speak for myself and I believe for the great majority of German-Americans when I say that we are with the President of the United States in all matters affecting National honor or National prestige.—HERMAN RIDDER in the *Staats-Zeitung*.

Maybe so; we hope so; but how happens it that none other has felt the need of proclaiming that he is not a perjurer or a traitor?